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Abstract
We survey a variety of possible explications of the term “Individual Risk.” These
in turn are based on a variety of interpretations of “Probability,” including Classical,
Enumerative, Frequency, Formal, Metaphysical, Personal, Propensity, Chance and
Logical conceptions of Probability, which we review and compare. We distinguish
between “groupist” and “individualist” understandings of Probability, and explore
both “group to individual” (G2i) and “individual to group” (i2G) approaches to
characterising Individual Risk. Although in the end that concept remains subtle and
elusive, some pragmatic suggestions for progress are made.
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Examples 3
3 Interpretations of Probability 5
3.1 Classical Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Enumerative Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Frequency Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4 Formal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4.1 Metaphysical Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5 Personal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6 Propensity and chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.7 Logical Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4 Examples Revisited 11
5 Risk and Expert Assignments 13
5.1 Personal Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 Chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3 Frequency Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1
6 Group to Individual Inference for Repeated Trials 14
6.1 Frequency probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2 Personal probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7 Individual Risk 19
7.1 “Deep” risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8 A Different Approach: Individual to Group Inference 21
8.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.1 Overall calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
8.1.2 Probability calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1.3 Subset calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
8.1.4 Information-based calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.2 Varying the information base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9 Discussion 26
2
1 Introduction
“Probability” and “Risk” are subtle and ambiguous concepts, subject to a wide range of
understandings and interpretations. Major differences in the interpretation of Probabil-
ity underlie the fundamental Frequentist/Bayesian schism in modern Statistical Science.
However, these terms, or their synonyms, are also in widespread general use, where lack of
appreciation of these subtleties can lead to ambiguity, confusion, and outright nonsense.
At the very least, such usages deserve careful attention to determine whether and when
they are meaningful, and if so in how many different ways. The focus of this article will
be on the concept of “Individual Risk,” which I shall subject to just such deep analysis.
To set the scene, §2 presents some examples displaying a variety of disparate usages
of the concept of Individual Risk. These, in turn, are predicated on a variety of different
understandings of the concept of Probability. I survey these in §3, returning to discuss
the examples in their light in §4. Section 5 describes the concept of “expert assignment,”
which is is common to a number of understandings of Risk. In §6 and §7 I consider various
aspects of “group to individual” (G2i) inference—the attempt to make sense of Individual
Risk when Probability is understood as a group phenomenon—and conclude that this can
not be done in an entirely satisfactory way. So §8 reverses this process and considers
“individual to group” (i2G) inference, where we take Individual Risk as a fundamental
concept, and explore what that implies about the behaviour of group frequencies. The i2G
approach appears to lead to essentially unique individual risk values; but these can not
be considered absolute, but are relative to a specified information base, and moreover are
typically not computable. In §9 I take stock of the overall picture. I conclude that the
concept of “Individual Risk” remains highly problematic at a deep philosophical level, but
that does not preclude our making some pragmatically valuable use of that concept—so
long as we are aware of the various pitfalls that may lie in our path.
2 Examples
We start with a me´nagerie of examples of “individual risk” in public discourse.
Example 1 A weather forecaster appears on television every night and issues a statement
of the form “The probability of precipitation tomorrow is 30%” (where the quoted proba-
bility will of course vary from day to day). Different forecasters issue different probabilities.
✷
Example 2 There has been much recent interest concerning the use of Actual Risk Assess-
ment Instruments (ARAIs): statistical procedures for assessing “the risk” of an individual
becoming violent (Singh and Petrila 2013). Thus a typical output of the Classification of
Violence Risk (COVR) software program, that can be used to inform diagnostic testimony
in civil commitment cases, might be: “The likelihood that XXX will commit a violent act
toward another person in the next several months is estimated to be between 20 and 32
percent, with a best estimate of 26 percent.” ✷
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Example 3 Aharoni et al. (2013) tested a group of released adult offenders on a go/no-go
task using fMRI, and examined the relation between task-related activity in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) and subsequent rearrest (over four years), allowing for a variety
of other risk factors. They found a significant relationship between ACC activation on
the go/no-go task and subsequent rearrest; whereas subjects with high ACC activity had
a 31% chance of rearrest, subjects with low ACC activity had a 52% chance. They con-
clude: “These results suggest a potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial
behavior.”
A newly released offender has low ACC activity: how should we judge his chance of
rearrest? ✷
Example 4 Writing in the New York Times (May 14 2013) about her decision to have
a preventive double mastectomy, the actress Angelina Jolie said: “I carry a faulty gene,
BRCA1, which sharply increases my risk of developing breast cancer and ovarian cancer.
My doctors estimated that I had an 87 percent risk of breast cancer and a 50 percent risk
of ovarian cancer, although the risk is different in the case of each woman.” ✷
Example 5 The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
issued in September 2013, contains the statements “It is extremely likely that human influ-
ence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century,”
“It is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0–700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it
likely warmed between the 1870s and 1971,” and “It is very likely that the Arctic sea ice
cover will continue to shrink and thin and that Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover
will decrease during the 21st century” (their italics). It is explained that virtually certain
is equivalent to a probability of at least 99%, extremely likely , at least 95%, very likely , at
least 90%, and likely , at least 66%. ✷
Example 6 On 4 May 2011, three days after he announced that American troops had
killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, US President Barack Obama said in an interview
with “60 Minutes” correspondent Steve Kroft:
At the end of the day, this was still a 55/45 situation. I mean, we could not
say definitively that bin Laden was there.
✷
Example 7 In a civil court case, the judgment might be expressed as: This is typically
interpreted as “with probability exceeding 50%.” ✷
In all the above examples we can ask: How were the quoted probabilities interpreted?
How might they be interpreted? And how might the quality of such probability forecasts
be measured?
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3 Interpretations of Probability
We have already remarked that the concept of “Probability” is a hotly contested philosophi-
cal issue.1 Even the many who have no patience for such philosophising are usually in thrall
to some implicit philosophical conception, which shapes their approach and understanding,
and their often fruitless arguments with others who (whether or not so recognised) have a
different understanding.
One axis along which the different theories and conceptions of Probability can be laid
out—and which is particularly germane to our present purpose—is whether they regard
Probability as fundamentally an attribute of groups, or of individuals. I will refer to these
as, respectively, “groupist” and “individualist” theories.
Below, in a necessarily abbreviated and admittedly idiosyncratic account, I outline
some of the different conceptions of Probability, and hope to bring out their relationships,
similarities and differences. For a fuller discussion see e.g. Ha´jek (2012); Galavotti (2014).
3.1 Classical Probability
If you studied any Probability at school, it will have focused on the behaviour of unbiased
coins, well-shuffled packs of cards, perfectly balanced roulette wheels, etc., etc. In short,
an excellent training for a life misspent in the Casino. This is the ambit of Classical
Probability .
The underlying conception is that we have a number of elementary outcomes of an
experiment, exactly one of which will actually be realised when the experiment is per-
formed. For example, there are N = 53, 644, 737, 765, 488, 792, 839, 237, 440, 000 ways in
which the cards at Bridge can be distributed among 4 players, and just one of these ways
will materialise when the cards are dealt. Any event of interest, for example “North holds 3
aces,” can be represented by the set of all the elementary outcomes for which it is the case;
and the number n of these, divided by the total number N of all elementary outcomes,
is taken as the measure of the probability of the event in question. The mathematics of
Classical Probability is thus really a branch of Combinatorial Analysis, the far from trivial
mathematical theory of counting.
Since the focus is on the specific outcome of (say) a particular deal of cards or roll of
a die, this classical conception is individualist. But questions as to the interpretation of
the “probabilities” computed rarely raise their heads. If they do, it would typically be
assumed (or regarded as a precondition for the applicability of the theory) that each of
the elementary outcomes is just as likely as any other to become the realised outcome.
However, in the absence of any independent understanding of the meaning of “likely,” such
an attempt at interpretation courts logical circularity. Furthermore, paradoxes arise when
there is more than one natural way to describe what the elementary events should be.
If we toss two coins, we could either form 3 elementary events: “0 heads,” “1 head,” “2
1Interestingly, this is not the case for its mathematical properties, where the “Kolmogorov axioms” are
largely accepted by all the main factions.
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heads”; or, taking order into account, 4 elementary events: “tail tail,” “tail head,” “head
tail,” “head head.” There is nothing within the theory to say we should prefer one choice
over the other. Also, it is problematic to extend the classical conception to cope with an
infinite number of events: for example, to describe a “random positive integer,” or a line
intersecting a given circle “at random.”
The principal modern application of Classical Probability is to situations—for example,
clinical trials—where randomisation is required to ensure fair allocation of treatments to
individuals. This can be effected by tossing a “fair coin” (or by simulating such tosses on
a computer).
3.2 Enumerative Probability
What I 2 here term Enumerative Probability can also be regarded as an exercise in counting.
Only now, instead of counting elementary outcomes of an experiment, we consider a finite
collection of individuals (of any nature), on which we can measure one or more pre-existing
attributes.
Thus consider a set of individuals, I1, I2, . . . , IN , and an attribute E that a generic
individual I may or may not possess: e.g. “smoker.” A specific individual Ik can be
classified according to whether or not its “instance,” Ek, of that attribute is present—e.g.,
whether or not Ik is a smoker. If we knew this for every individual, we could compute the
relative frequency with which E occurs in the set, which is just the number of individuals
having attribute E, divided by the total number N of individuals. This relative frequency
is the “enumerative probability” of E in the specified set. Clearly this is a “groupist”
conception of probability.
Of course, the value of such an enumerative probability will depend on the set of
individuals considered, as well as what attributes they possess. We will often care about the
constitution of some specific large population (say, the population of the United Kingdom),
but have data only for a small sample. Understanding the relationship between the known
frequencies in the sample and the unknown frequencies in the whole population is the
focus of the theory and methodology of sample surveys. This typically requires the use of
randomisation to select the sample—so relying, in part, on the Classical conception.
Although based on similar constructions in terms of counting and combinatorial analy-
sis, Classical and Enumerative Probability are quite different in their scope and application.
Thus suppose we ask: What is “the probability” that a new-born child in the United King-
dom will be a boy? Using the Classical interpretation, with just two outcomes, boy or girl,
the answer would be 1/2 = 0.5. But in the UK population about 53% of live births are
male, so the associated Enumerative Probability is 0.53.
2Though probably no one else. Ha´jek (2012) uses the term “finite frequentism.”
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3.3 Frequency Probability
“Frequency probability” can be thought of as enumerative probability stretched to its
limits: instead of a finite set of individuals, we consider an infinite set.
There are two immediate problems with this:
1. Infinite populations do not exist in the real world, so any such set is an idealisation.
2. Notwithstanding that the great statistician Sir Ronald Fisher manipulated “propor-
tions in an infinite population” with great abandon and to generally good effect, this
is not a well-defined mathematical concept.
These problems are to some extent resolved in the usual scenario to which this concept of
probability is attached: that of repeated trials under identical conditions . The archetypical
example is that of tosses of a possibly biased coin, supposed to be repeated indefinitely.
The “individuals” are now the individual tosses, and the generic outcome is (say) heads
(H), having instances of the form “toss i results in heads.” It is important that the
“individuals” are arranged in a definite sequence, for example time order. Then for any
finite integer N we can restrict attention to the sequence of all tosses from toss 1 up to
toss N , and form the associated enumerative probability, fN say, of heads: the relative
frequency of heads in this finite set. We next consider how fN behaves as we increase the
total number N without limit. If fN approaches closer and closer to some mathematical
limit p—the “limiting relative frequency” of heads—then that limiting value may be termed
the “frequency probability” of heads in the sequence.
Of course we can never observe infinitely many tosses, so even the existence of the limit
must remain an assumption: one that is, however, given some empirical support by the
observed behaviour of real-world frequencies in such repeated trial situations. But even
when we can happily believe that the limit p exists, we will never have the infinite amount
of data that would be needed to determine its value precisely. Much of the enterprise of
statistical inference addresses the subtle relationship between actual frequencies, observed
in finite sequence of trials, and the ideal “frequency probabilities” that inhabit infinity.
Richard von Mises (1939) attempted to build a sophisticated mathematical theory of
probability built upon the above frequency conception as its primitive element, but that
is now largely of historical interest.
3.4 Formal Probability
A prime task for an applied statistician is to build a “statistical model” of a phenomenon
of interest. That phenomenon could be fairly simple, such as recording the outcomes of a
sequence of 10 tosses of a coin; or much more sophisticated, such as a description of the
earth’s temperature as it varies over space and time. Any such model will have symbols
representing particular outcomes and quantities (e.g., the result of the 10th toss of the
coin, or the recorded temperature at the Greenwich Royal Observatory at noon GMT on
24 September 2020), and will model these (jointly with all the other outcomes and quan-
tities under consideration) as “random variables,” having a joint probability distribution.
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Typically the probabilities figuring in this distribution are treated as unknown, and statis-
tical data-analysis is conducted to learn something about them. There does not seem to
be a generally accepted terminology for these probabilities figuring in a statistical model:
I shall term them “Formal Probabilities.”
Since the focus of statistical attention is on learning these formal probabilities, I find
it remarkable how little discussion is to be found as to their meaning and interpretation.
In particular, is Formal Probability an individualist or a groupist conception? The ele-
mentary building blocks of the statistical model are assignments of probabilities to specific
events, so prima facie it looks like an individualist conception. One possible individualist
interpretation of a formal probability value is as a propensity—see §3.6 below—although
this raises problems of its own.
In any case, many users of statistical models would not be happy to accept an individ-
ualist interpretation of their formal probabilities, and prefer a groupist account of them.
Thus consider the simple case of coin-tossing. The usual statistical model for this assigns
some common (though typically unknown) formal probability p to each event Ek: “the kth
toss Ik results in heads,” for every k; and further models all these tosses, as k varies, as
independent. An application of Bernoulli’s Law of Large Numbers shows that this implies
that, with probability 1, the limiting relative frequency of heads in the sequence will exist
and have value p. And many statisticians would claim that—notwithstanding that the
formal probabilities are attached to individual tosses—this groupist Frequency Probabil-
ity interpretation is the only meaningful content of the (superfically individualist) formal
“Bernoulli model.”
However, such a ploy is far from straightforward for more complex models, where there
may be no natural way of embedding an individual event in a sequence of similar events.
For example, if we construct a spatio-temporal statistical model of the weather, the model
might well contain a parameter that measures the correlation between the temperatures
in Greenwich and New York at noon GMT on 24 September 2020. But just how is such
a correlation, between two “one-off” quantities, to be interpreted? Does it have any real-
world counterpart?
One possible way of taking the above “Law of Large Numbers” approach for the
Bernoulli model and extending it to more general models (Dawid 2004) is by identify-
ing those events that are assigned probability 1 by the assumed model, and asserting that
the only valid interpretation of the model lies in its claim that these events will occur. But
this may be seen as throwing too much away.
Because there is little discussion and no real shared understanding of the interpretation
of Formal Probability, pointless disagreements can spring up as to the appropriateness of
a statistical model of some phenomenon. An example of practical importance for foren-
sic DNA profiling arises in population genetics, where there has been disagreement as
to whether the genes of distinct individuals within the same subpopulation should be
modelled as independent, as claimed by Roeder et al. (1998), or correlated, as claimed by
Foreman et al. (1997). However, without a shared understanding of what (if anything) the
correlation parameter in the formal model relates to in the real world, this is a pointless
argument. It was pointed out by Dawid (1998) that (like blind men’s disparate understand-
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ings of the same elephant) both positions can be incorporated within the same hierarchical
statistical model, where the formal correlation can come or go, according to what it is
taken as conditioned on. So while the two approaches superficially appear at odds, at a
deeper level they are in agreement.
3.4.1 Metaphysical Probability
There are those who, insistent on having some sort of frequency-based foundation for prob-
ability, would attempt to interpret a “one-off” probability as an average over repetitions of
the whole underlying phenomenon. For example, the correlation between the temperatures
in Greenwich and New York at noon GMT on 24 September 2020 would be taken to refer
to an average over—necessarily hypothetical—independent repetitions of the whole past
and future development of weather on Earth. This conception appears close to the “many
worlds” interpretation of quantum probabilities currently popular with some physicists. I
confess I find it closer to science fiction than to real science—“metaphysical,” not “physi-
cal.” At any rate, since we can never observe beyond the single universe we in fact inhabit,
we can not make any practical use of such hypothetical repetitions.
That said, this way of thinking can be useful, purely as an analogy, in helping people
internalise a probability value (whatever its provenance or philosophical back-story). Thus
one of the options at
http://understandinguncertainty.org/files/animations/RiskDisplay1/RiskDisplay.html
for visualising a risk value is a graphic containing a number of symbols for your “possible
futures,” marked as red to indicate that the event occurs in that future, green that it does
not. The relevant probability is then represented by the proportion of these symbols that
are red. It is not necessary to take the “possible futures” story seriously in order to find
this enumerative representation of a probability value helpful. The same purely psycho-
logical conceit explains the misleading name given to the so-called “frequentist” approach
to statistical inference. This involves computing the probabilistic properties of a suggested
statistical procedure. For example, a test of a null hypothesis at significance level 5%
is constructed to have the property that probability of deciding to reject the hypothesis,
under the assumption that it is in fact correct, is at most 0.05. Fisher’s explication of such
a test was that, when the it results in the decision to reject, either the null hypothesis was
indeed false, or else an event of small probability has happened—and since we can largely
discount the latter alternative, we have evidence for the former. Although for this purpose
it would be perfectly satisfactory to interpret the probability value 0.05 as an “individual
chance,” relating solely to the current specific application of the procedure, it is almost
universally expressed metaphysically, by a phrase such as “over many hypothetical repeti-
tions of the same procedure, when the null hypothesis is true, it will rejected at most 5%
of the time.”
3.5 Personal Probability
Personal (often, though less appropriately, termed Subjective) Probability is very much an
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individualist approach. Indeed, not only does it associate a probability value, say p, with
an individual event, say E, it also associates it with the individual, say “You,” who is
making the assignments, as well as (explicitly or implicitly) with the information, say H ,
available to You when You make the assignment. Thus if You are a weather forecaster,
You might assess Your probability of rain tomorrow, given Your knowledge of historical
weather to date, at 40%. Another forecaster would probably make a different personal
assessment, as would You if You had different information (perhaps additional output
from a meteorological computer system) or were predicting for a different day.
What is the meaning of Your 40%? The standard view is that it simply describes the
odds at which You would be willing to bet on “rain tomorrow.” If Classical Probability is
modelled on the casino, then Personal Probability is modelled on the race-track.
If You really really had to bet, You would have to come up with a specific numerical
value for Your personal probability. Thus to a Personalist there is no such thing as an “un-
known probability,” and it appears that these should not feature in any probability model
You might build. There is however an interesting and instructive relationship between
such Personalist models and the statistical models, as described in §3.4, that do feature
unknown formal probability values—for more on this see §6.2 below.
3.6 Propensity and chance
The interpretation of Probability as a “Propensity” was championed by Popper (1959),
and is still much discussed by philosophers—though hardly at all by statisticians. The
overall idea is that a particular proposed coin-toss (under specified circumstances) has a
certain (typically unknown) “propensity” to yields heads, if it were to be conducted—just
as a particular lump of arsenic has a propensity to cause death if it were to be ingested.
This is clearly an individualist (though non-Personalist) conception of Probability, but
there is little guidance available as to how a propensity probability is to be understood,
or how its value might be assessed, except by reference to some “groupist” frequency
interpretation. Indeed, some versions of the propensity account (Gillies 2000) take them as
referring directly to the behaviour of repetitive sequences, rather than to that of individual
events.
Another individualist term that is very close in spirit to “propensity” is “(objective)
chance.” The “Principal Principle” of Lewis (1980), while not defining chance, relates it to
personal probability by requiring that, if You learn (don’t ask how!) that the chance of an
event A is (say) 0.6, and nothing else, then Your personal probability of A should be up-
dated to be 0.6. And further conditions may be required: for example, that this assessment
would be unaffected if You learned of any other “admissible” event, where “admissible”
might mean “prior to A,” or “independent of A in their joint chance distribution.” Such
conditions are difficult to make precise and convincing (Pettigrew 2102). In any case, the
Principal Principle gives no guidance on how to compute or estimate an individual chance.
10
3.7 Logical Probability
Yet another non-Personalist individualist conception of Probability is Logical Probability,
associated with Jeffreys (1939); Carnap (1950) and others. This is similar to the propen-
sity/chance account in considering that there is an “objective” probability value associated
with a given outcome, but differs from those in emphasising the relativity of that value to
the information upon which it is premissed. Once again there would seem to be no routine
and unambiguous way of computing such logical probability values.
4 Examples Revisited
We here revisit the examples of §2 in the light of some of the above discussion. My own
comments are interpolated in [. . . ].
Example 1 Gigerenzer et al. (2005) randomly surveyed pedestrians in five metropolises
located in countries that have had different degrees of exposure to probabilistic forecasts:
Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Milan, and New York. Participants were told to imagine that
the weather forecast, based on today’s weather constellation, predicts “There is a 30%
chance of rain tomorrow,” and to explain what they understood by that.
Several people in New York and Berlin thought that the rain probability
statement means “3 out of 10 meteorologists believe it will rain” [a form of
enumerative probability?]. A woman in Berlin said, “Thirty percent means
that if you look up to the sky and see 100 clouds, then 30 of them are black” [a
different form of enumerative probability]. Participants in Amsterdam seemed
the most inclined to interpret the probability in terms of the amount of rain.
“It’s not about time, it indicates the amount of rain that will fall,” explained
a young woman in Amsterdam. Some people seemed to intuitively grasp the
essence of the “days” interpretation, albeit in imaginative ways. For instance,
a young woman in Athens in hippie attire responded, “If we had 100 lives, it
would rain in 30 of these tomorrow” [a metaphysical interpretation?]. One of the
few participants who pointed out the conflict between various interpretations
observed, “A probability is only about whether or not there is rain, but does
not say anything about the time and region,” while another said, “It’s only
the probability that it rains at all, but not about how much” [two individualist
views]. Many participants acknowledged that, despite a feeling of knowing,
they were incapable of explaining what a probability of rain means.
[According to the authors of the paper, the standard meteorological inter-
pretation is: when the weather conditions are like today, in 3 out of 10 cases
there will be (at least a trace of) rain the next day.]
✷
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Example 2 There has been heated recent debate centred on the construction and validity
of confidence intervals for the “individual risks” output by an ARAI. This has been initiated
and promoted by Hart et al. (2007); Cooke and Michie (2010); Hart and Cooke (2013), whose
analysis has had a strong influence (see e.g. Singh and Petrila (2013)), but has been widely
criticised for serious technical statistical errors and confusions (Harris et al. 2008; Hanson and Howard 2010;
Imrey and Dawid 2014; Mossman 2014). However, to date that debate has largely sidestepped
the crucial question of the meaning of such an individual risk.
Hart et al. (2007) make the following argument in an attempt to distinguish between
group and individual risks:
To illustrate our use of Wilson’s method for determining group and indi-
vidual margins of error, let us take an example. Suppose that Dealer, from an
ordinary deck of cards, deals one to Player. If the card is a diamond, Player
loses; but if the card is one of the other three suits, Player wins. After each
deal, Dealer replaces the card and shuffles the deck. If Dealer and Player play
10 000 times, Player should be expected to win 75% of the time. Because the
sample is so large, the margin of error for this group estimate is very small, with
a 95% CI of 74–76% according to Wilson’s method. Put simply, Player can be
95% certain that he will win between 74 and 76% of the time. However, as the
number of plays decreases, the margin of error gets larger. If Dealer and Player
play 1000 times, Player still should expect to win 75% of the time, but the 95%
CI increases to 72–78%; if they play only 100 times, the 95% CI increases to
66–82%. Finally, suppose we want to estimate the individual margin of error.
For a single deal, the estimated probability of a win is still 75% but the 95%
CI is 12–99%. The simplest interpretation of this result is that Player cannot
be highly confident that he will win—or lose—on a given deal
[On 10 000, 1000 or 100 deals, the actual success rate will vary randomly about its
target value of 75%, and the “confidence intervals” (CIs) described for these cases are
intended to give some idea of the possible extent of that variation. But on a single deal
the actual success rate can only be 0 (which will be the case with probability 25%) or
100% (with probability 75%). This purely binary variation is not usefully described by
any “confidence interval,” let alone the above one of 12–99%, based on a misconceived
application of Wilson’s method. See Imrey and Dawid (2014) for further deconstruction of
the spurious philosophical and mathematical arguments presented by these authors.] ✷
Example 3 Poldrack et al. (2014) point out that the results given by Aharoni et al. (2013)
provide inflated estimates of the predictive accuracy of the model when generalizing to new
individuals: their reanalysis using a cross-validation approach found that addition of brain
activation to the predictive model improves predictive accuracy by less than 3% com-
pared to a baseline model without activation. The alternative bootstrap-based reanalysis
in Aharoni et al. (2014) likewise finds the original estimates to have been over-inflated,
though their correction is smaller. The message is that it can be extremely difficult to
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obtain reliable estimates of reoffending rates, and any causal attribution, e.g. to ACC
activity, would be even more precarious.
All these objections aside, suppose we had reliable estimates of the statistical parame-
ters in a well-fitting statistical model, from which we could compute a “reoffending rate”
for this new individual. Is it appropriate to regard such a formal probability value, based
on a statistical analysis of group data, as the appropriate expression of his individual risk?
✷
Example 4 Angelina Jolie’s statement sounds very much like an “individualist” interpre-
tation of the figure “87 percent risk of breast cancer,” especially in the light of “the risk
is different in the case of each woman.” However it would appear that this figure is taken
from the website of Myriad Genetics, on which it says “People with a mutation in either
the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene have risks of up to 87% for developing breast cancer by age
70.” This is clearly an enumerative probability. So was Angelina (or her doctor) right to
interpret it as her own individual risk? ✷
Example 5 The events and scenarios considered by the IPCC are fundamentally “one-
off,” so any attempt at interpreting the quoted probabilities must be individualistic. But
of what nature? (It was suggested in a radio commentary that a probability of 95% means
that 95% of scientists agree with the statement). ✷
Example 6 It would be very interesting to know just how the President conceived of this
55% probability of success for a one-off event. We might also ask: Was that probability
assessment justified (in any sense) by the turn-out of events? ✷
Example 7 While there has been much discussion as to relationship between “legal”
and “mathematical” probabilities, this is apparently an assertion about uncertainty in
an individual case. Such assessments might best be construed as personal probabilities,
though they are notoriously subject to bias and volatility (Fox and Birke 2002). ✷
5 Risk and Expert Assignments
Our focus in this article is on the concept of the single-case “individual risk,” and we shall
be exploring how this is or could be interpreted from the point of view of the various
different conceptions of probability outlined above. One theme common to a number of
those conceptions is that of risk as an “expert assignment” (Gaifman 1988). This means
that, if You start from a position of ignorance, and then somehow learn (only) that “the
risk” (however understood) of outcome A is p, then p should be the measure of Your new
uncertainty about A.
5.1 Personal Probability
Consider this first from the Personalist point of view. Suppose You learn the personal
probability p, for event A, of an individual E (the “expert”) who started out with exactly
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the same overall personal probability distribution as You did, but has observed more things,
so altering her uncertainty. By learning p You are effectively learning, indirectly, all the
relevant extra data that E has brought to bear on her uncertainty for A, so You too should
now assign personal probability p to event A. Note that this definition of expert is itself
a personal one: an expert for You need not be an expert for some one else with different
opinions or knowledge.
This example shows that the property of being an expert assignment is quite weak,
since there could be a number of different experts who have observed different things and
so have different updated personal probabilities. Whichever one of these You learn, You
should now use that value as Your own.
Regardless of which expert You are considering consulting (but have not yet consulted),
Your current expectation of her expert probability p will be Your own, unupdated, personal
probability of A. In particular, mere knowledge of the existence of an expert has no effect
on the odds You should currently be willing to offer on the outcome of A.
What if You learn the personal probabilities of several different experts? It is far from
straightforward to combine these to produce Your own revised probability (Dawid et al. 1995),
since this must depend on the extent to which the experts share common information, and
would typically differ from each individual expert assignment—even if these were all iden-
tical.
5.2 Chance
As for “objective chance,” the Principal Principle makes explicit that (whatever it may
be) it should act as an expert assignment, and moreover that this should hold for every
personalist—it is a “universal expert.” But while this constrains what we can take objective
chance to be, it is far from being a characterisation.
5.3 Frequency Probability
The relationship between frequencies and expert assignments is considered in detail in §6
below.
6 Group to Individual Inference for Repeated Trials
As we have seen, some conceptions of Probability are fundamentally “groupist,” and others
fundamentally “individualist.” That does not mean that a groupist approach has nothing
to say about individual probabilities, nor that an individualist approach can not address
group issues. But the journey between these two extremes, in either direction, can be a
tricky one. Our aim in this article is to explore this journey, with special emphasis on
the interpretation of individual probabilities, or “risks.” In this Section, we consider the
“group to individual” (G2i) journey; the opposite (i2G) direction will be examined in §8
below.
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We start by considering a simple archetypical example. A coin is to be tossed repeatedly.
What is “the probability” that it will land heads (H) up (event E1) on the first toss (I1)?
We shall consider how various conceptions of Probability might approach this question.
6.1 Frequency probability
The frequency approach apparently has nothing to say about the first toss I1. Suppose
however that (very) lengthy experimentation with this coin has shown that the limiting
relative frequency of heads, over infinitely many tosses, is 0.3. Can we treat that value 0.3
as representing uncertainty about the specific outcome E1? Put otherwise, can we treat
the limiting relative frequency of heads as a (universal) expert assignment for the event of
heads on the first toss?
While there is no specific warrant for this move within the theory itself, it would
generally be agreed that we are justified in doing so if all the tosses of the coin (including
toss I1) can be regarded as
“repeated trials of the same phenomenon under identical conditions.”
We shall not attempt a close explication of the various terms in this description, but note
that there is a basic assumption of identity of all relevant characteristics of the different
tosses.
6.2 Personal probability
By contrast, the Personalist You would be perfectly willing to bet on whether or not the
next toss will land heads up, even without knowing how other tosses of the coin may turn
out. But how do Your betting probabilities relate to frequencies?
In order to make this connexion, we have to realise that You are supposed to be able
to assess Your betting probability, not merely for the outcome of each single toss, but for
an arbitrary specified combination of outcomes of different tosses: for example, for the
event that the results of the first 7 tosses will be HHTTHTH in that order. That is, You
have a full personal probability distribution over the full sequence of future outcomes. In
particular, You could assess (say) the conditional probability that the 101th toss would be
H, given that there were (say) 75 Hs and 25 Ts on the first 100 tosses. Now, before being
given that information You might well have no reason to favour H over T, and so assign
unconditional probability close to 0.5 to getting a H at the 101th toss. However, after that
information becomes available You might well favour a conditional probability closer to
0.75. All this is by way of saying that—unlike for the Bernoulli model for repeated trials
introduced in §3.4 above—in Your joint betting distribution the tosses would typically not
be independent; since, if they were, no information about the first 100 tosses could change
Your probability of seeing H on the 101th.
But if You cannot assume independence, what can You assume about Your joint distri-
bution for the tosses? Here is one property that might seem reasonable: that You simply
do not care what order You will see the tosses in. This requires, for example, that Your
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probability of observing the sequence HHTTHTH should be the same as that of the se-
quence HTHHTHT, and the same again for any other sequence containing 4 Hs and 3
Ts. This would not be so if, for example, You felt the coin was wearing out with use and
acquiring an increasing bias towards H as time passes.
This property of the irrelevance of ordering is termed exchangeability . It is much weaker
than independence, and will often be justifiable, at least to an acceptable approximation.
Now it is a remarkable fact (de Finetti 1937) that, so long only as Your joint distribution
is exchangeable, the following must hold:
1. You believe, with probability 1, that there will exist a limiting relative frequency ,
p = limN→∞ fN , of H’s, as the number N of tosses observed tends to infinity.
2. You typically do not initially know the value of p (though You could place bets on
that value—You have a distribution for p); but if You were somehow to learn the
value of p, then conditionally on that information You would regard all the tosses as
being independent, with common probability p of landing H. (There are echoes here
of the Principal Principle).
According to 1, under the weak assumption of exchangeability, the “individualist” Person-
alist can essentially accept the “groupist” Frequency story: more specifically, the Bernoulli
model (with unknown probability p). But the Personalist can go even further than the
Frequentist: according to 2, exchangeability provides a warrant for equating the “individ-
ual risk,” on each single toss, with the overall “group probability” p (if only that were
known. . . ). That is, the Bernoulli model will be agreed upon by all personalists who
agree on exchangeability (Dawid 1982a), and the limiting relative frequency p, across the
repeated trials, constitutes a universal expert assignment for this class.
However, an important way in which this Personalist interpretation of the Bernoulli
model differs from that of the Frequentist is in the conditions for its applicability. Ex-
changeability is justifiable when You have no sufficient reason to distinguish between the
various trials. This is a much weaker requirement than the Frequentist’s “identity of all
relevant characteristics.” For example, suppose You are considering the examination out-
comes of a large number of students. You know there will be differences in ability between
the students, so they can not be regarded as identical in all relevant respects. However,
if You have no specific knowledge about the students that would enable You to distin-
guish the geniuses from the dunces, it could still be reasonable to treat these outcomes as
exchangeable.
An important caveat is that Your judgment of exchangeability is, explicitly or implicitly,
conditioned on Your current state of information, and can be destroyed if Your information
changes. In the above example of the students, since You are starting with an exchangeable
distribution, You believe there will be an overall limiting relative frequency p of failure
across all the students, and that if You were to learn p that would be Your correct revised
probability that a particular student, Karl, will fail the exam. Suppose, however, You were
then to learn something about different students’ abilities. This would not affect Your
belief (with probability 1) in the existence of the group limiting relative frequency p—but
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You would no longer be able to treat that p as the individual probability of failure for Karl
(who, You now know, is particularly bright).
As an illustration of the above, suppose You are considering the performances of the
students (whom You initially consider exchangeable) across a large number of examination
papers. Also, while You believe that some examinations are easier than others, You have
no specific knowledge as to which those might be, so initially regard the examinations
as exchangeable. Now consider the full collection of all outcomes, labelled by student and
examination. As a Personalist, You will have a joint distribution for all of these. Moreover,
because of Your exchangeability judgments, that joint distribution would be unchanged if
You were to shuffle the names of the students, or of the examinations. Suppose now
You are interested in “the risk” that Karl will fail the Statistics examination. You might
confine attention to Karl, and use the limiting relative frequency of his failures, across
all his other examinations, as his “risk” of failing Statistics. This appears reasonable
since You are regarding Karl’s performances across all examinations (including Statistics)
as exchangeable. In particular, this limiting relative frequency of Karl’s failure, across
all examinations, constitutes an expert assignment for the event of his failing Statistics.
Alternatively, You could concentrate on the Statistics examination, and take the limiting
relative frequency of failure on that examination, by all the other students, as measuring
Karl’s risk of failing. This too seems justifiable—and supplies an expert assignment—
because You consider the performances of all the students (including Karl) on the Statistics
examination as exchangeable. However, these two “risks” will typically differ—because
they are conditioned on different information. Indeed, neither can take account of the full
information You might have, about the performances of all students on all examinations.
Given that full information, You should be able to assess both Karl’s ability (by comparing
his average performance with those of the other students) and the difficulty of the Statistics
examination (on comparing the average performance in Statistics with those for other
examination). Somehow or other You need to use all this information (as well as the
performances of other students on other examinations) to come up with Your “true” risk
that Karl will fail Statistics—but it is far from obvious how You should go about this.3
We can elaborate such examples still further. Thus suppose students are allowed unlim-
ited repeat attempts at each examination, and that (for each student-examination combi-
nation) we can regard the results on repeated attempts as exchangeable. Then yet another
interpretation of Karl’s risk of failing Statistics on some given attempt—yet another uni-
versal expert assignment—would be the limiting relative frequency of failure across all
Karl’s repeat attempts at the Statistics examination. This would typically differ from all
the values discussed above.
Now it can be shown that, for this last interpretation of risk, its value would be unaf-
fected by further taking into account all the rest of the data on other students’ performances
on other examinations: it is truly conditional on all that is (or could be) known about the
3There is in principle a way to do this (Aldous 1981; Hoover 1982), supplying a universal expert as-
signment for the class of all personalists agreeing on exchangeability both across students and across
examinations—but it relies on advanced mathematics and is highly non-trivial to implement.
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various students’ performances. Does this mean that we have finally identified the “true”
risk of Karl failing Statistics?
Not so fast. . . Suppose You consider that Karl’s confidence, and hence his performance,
on future attempts will be affected by his previous results, his risk of future failure going up
whenever he fails, and down whenever he passes. It is not difficult to make this behaviour
consistent with the exchangeability properties already assumed (Hill et al. 1987). As a
simple model, consider an urn that initially contains 1 red ball (representing success)
and 1 green ball (representing failure). Karl’s successive performances are described by
the sequence of draws of balls from this urn, made as follows: whichever ball is drawn
is immediately replaced, together with an additional ball of the same colour. At each
stage it is assumed the draws are made “at random,” with each ball currently in the urn
being “equally likely” to be the next to be drawn (this being a reasonably straightforward
application of the classical interpretation). Thus Karl’s future performance is influenced
by his past successes and failures, with each success [failure] increasing [decreasing] the
(classical) chance of success at the next attempt.
Now it can be shown that the sequence of colours drawn forms an exchangeable process,
and it follows that the relative frequency with which a red ball is drawn, over a long
sequence of such draws, will converge to some limit p. However, at the start of the process
p is not known, but is distributed uniformly over the unit interval. How would you assess
the probability that the first draw will result in a red ball? Useless to speculate about the
currently unknown value of the limiting relative frequency p; the sensible answer is surely
the “classical” value 1/2.
In this case, while You still believe that there will exist a limiting relative frequency
of failure across all Karl’s attempts at Statistics (and this constitutes a universal expert
assignment), not only is this initially unknown to You, but its very value can be regarded
as being constructed over time, as Karl experiences successes and failures and his level of
performance gets better and worse accordingly. So why should You regard the limiting
relative frequency of future failures, dependent as this is on Karl’s randomly varying per-
formance in his future attempts, as an appropriate measure of his risk of failing on this, his
first attempt? As commented by Cane (1977) in a parallel context: “. . . if several clones
were grown, each under the same conditions, an observer. . .might feel that the various
values [e.g., of a limiting proportion—APD ] they showed needed explanation, although
these values could in fact be attributed to chance events.” This point is relevant to the
assessment of risk in the context of an individual’s criminal career (cf. Example 2), where
the very act of committing a new offence might be thought to raise the likelihood of still
further offences. “An increase in criminal history increases the likelihood of recidivism,
and a lack of increase can reduce that likelihood. Because criminal history can increase (or
not) over time and each crime’s predictive shelf life may be limited, it seems important to
conceptualize criminal history as a variable marker” (Monahan and Skeem 2014).
It is interesting to view this ambiguity as to what should be taken as the “real” risk of
success—the “classical” proportion of red balls currently in the urn, or the “frequentist”
proportion of red balls drawn over the whole sequence—from a Personalist standpoint.
Both constitute expert assignments for You, but they differ. The former is more concrete,
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in that You can actually observe (or compute) it at any stage, which You can not do for
the latter.
Suppose You are forced to bet on the colour of the first ball to be drawn. From the
classical view, the probability value to use is 0.5 (and that classical value is fully known
to You). Alternatively, taking a frequency view, You would consider the unknown limiting
proportion p, with its uniform distribution over the unit interval. For immediate betting
purposes, the relevant aspect of this is its expectation—which is again 0.5. Thus the
personalist does not have to choose between the two different ways of construing “the
probability” of success. (This is a special case of the result mentioned in §5.1 above).
And this indifference extends to each stage of the process: if there are currently r red
and b black balls in the urn, Your betting probability for next drawing a red, based on
Your current expectation (given Your knowledge of r and b, which are determined by
the results of previous draws) of the unknown limiting “frequency probability” p, will be
r/(r + b)—again agreeing with the known “classical” value.
But what is the relevance of the above “balls in urn” model to the case of Karl’s repeat
attempts? Even though the two stories may be mathematically equivalent, there is no real
analogue, for Karl, of the “classical” probability based on counting the balls in the urn:
Your probability r/(r+ b) of Karl’s failing on his first attempt is merely a feature of Your
Personalist view of the world, with limited relevance for any one else. So—what is “the
risk” in this situation?
7 Individual Risk
Stories of coin tosses and such are untypical of real-world applications of risk and proba-
bility. So now we turn to a more realistic example:
Example 8 What is “the risk” that Sam will die in the next 12 months? ✷
You might have good reason to be interested in this risk: perhaps You are Sam’s life
assurance company, or You Yourself are Sam. There is plenty of mortality data around;
but Sam is an individual, with many characteristics that, in sum (and in Sam), are unique
to him. This makes it problematic to apply either of the G2i arguments above. As a
Frequentist, You would need to be able to regard Sam and all the other individuals in the
mortality data-files as “identical in all relevant characteristics,” which seems a tall order;
while the Personalist You would need to be able to regard Sam and all those other indi-
viduals as exchangeable—but will typically know too much about Sam for that condition
to be appropriate.
How then could You tune Your risk of Sam’s death to the ambient data? A common
way of proceeding is to select a limited set of background variables to measure on all indi-
viduals, Sam included. For example, we might classify individuals by means of their age,
sex, smoking behaviour, fruit and alcohol intake, and physical activity. We could then re-
strict attention to the subset of individuals, in the data, that match Sam’s values for these
variables, and regard the (ideal limiting) relative frequency of death within 12 months in
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that subset4 as a measure of Sam’s own risk.5 To the extent that You can regard Sam
as exchangeable with all the other individuals sharing his values for the selected charac-
teristics, the limiting relative frequency in that group constitutes an expert assignment
for Sam. There can be no dispute that. from a pragmatic standpoint, such information
about frequencies in a group of people “like Sam” (or “like Angelina”) can be extremely
helpful and informative. In Imrey and Dawid (2014) such a group frequency, regarded as
relevant to an individual member of the group, is termed an “individualized risk.” The
foundational philosophical question, however, is: Can we consider this as supplying a mea-
sure of “individual risk”? For the Frequentist, that would require a belief that the chosen
attributes capture “all relevant characteristics” of the individuals; for the Personalist, it
would require that You have no relevant additional information about Sam (or any of the
other individuals in the data), and can properly assume exchangeability—conditional on
the limited information that is being taken into account. Neither of these requirements is
fully realistic.
In any case, irrespective of philosophical considerations, there are two obvious difficul-
ties with the above “individualization” approach:
• The “risk” so computed will depend on the choice of background variables.
• We may be obliged to ignore potentially relevant information that we have about
Sam.
These difficulties are often branded “the problem of the reference class,” and would seem
to bedevil any attempt to construct an unassailable definition of “individual risk” from a
groupist perspective.
7.1 “Deep” risk
The above difficulties might disappear if it were the case that, as we added more and
more background information, the frequency value in the matching subpopulation settled
down to a limit: what we might term the “deep” risk, conditional on all there is to know
about Sam. However, it is not at all clear why such limiting stability should be the case,
nor is there much empirical evidence in favour of such a hypothesis. Indeed, it would be
difficult to gather such evidence, since, as we increase the level of detail in our background
information, so the set of individuals who match Sam on that information will dwindle,
eventually leaving just Sam himself.
Even for the case of tossing a coin, it could be argued that if we know “too much”
about the circumstances of its tossing, that would lead to a very different assessment of
the probability of H; perhaps even, with sufficiently microscopic information about the
initial positions and momenta of the molecules of the thumb, the coin, the table and the
4Or, we could set up a statistical model for the form of the dependence of this risk on the given
attributes, estimate its parameters from the ambient data, and apply it to Sam.
5An animation for exploring the dependence of this frequency on these characteristics (as well as
calendar year) can be found at the website understandinguncertainty.org.
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air, the outcome of the toss would become perfectly predictable, and the “deep” probability
would reduce to 0 or 1 (or perhaps not, if we take quantum phenomena into account. . . ).
I would personally be sympathetic to the view that this reductio ad absurdum is a “cat-
egory error,” since no one really intended the “deep” information to be quite that deep.
Perhaps it is the case that the addition of more and more “appropriate” background infor-
mation, at a more superfical level, would indeed lead to a stabilisation of the probability
of H at some non-trivial value. But this account is full of vagueness and ambiguities, and
begs many questions. And even if we could resolve it for the extremely untypical case of
coin-tossing, that would not give us a licence to assume the existence of “deep risk” for
more typical practical examples, such as Sam’s dying in the next 12 months.
8 A Different Approach: Individual to Group Infer-
ence
All our discussion so far—even for the “individualist” Personalist conception of Probability—
has centred on “Group to Individual” (G2i) inference: taking group frequencies as our
fundamental starting point, and asking how these might be used to determine individual
risks. And it has to be said that we have reached no conclusive answer to this question.
So instead we now turn things upside down, and ask: Suppose we take individual risks as
fundamental—how then could we relate these to group frequencies, and with what conse-
quences? This is the “Individual to Group” (i2G) approach. As we shall see, although we
will not now be defining individual risks in terms of group frequencies, those frequencies
will nevertheless severely constrain what we can take the individual risks to be.
Our basic framework is again an ordered population of individuals (I1, I2, . . .). For
individual Ik, You have an outcome event of interest, Ek, and some background informa-
tion, Hk. We denote Your “information base”—Your full set of background information
(H1, H2, . . .) on all individuals—by H.
Note, importantly, that in this approach we need not assume that You have similar
information for different individuals, nor even that the different outcome events are of the
same type (though in applications that will typically be the case). In particular, we shall
not impose any analogue of either the Frequentist’s condition of “repeated trials under
identical conditions,” or the Personalist’s judgment of exchangeability.
We start with an initial bold assumption: that You have been able to assess, for each
individual Ik, a probability, pk = Pr(Ek | Hk), for the associated event Ek, in the light of
the associated background information Hk. This might, but need not be, interpreted as a
Personalist betting probability: all that we want is that it be some sort of “individualist”
assessment of uncertainty. We put no other constraint on these “individual risks”—most
important, they will typically vary from one individual to another. We term pk a probability
forecast for Ek. For some purposes we will require that the forecasts are based only on
the information in H, and nothing else. There are some subtleties involved in making
this intuitively meaningful condition mathematically precise—one approach is through the
21
theory of computability (Dawid 1985a). Here we will be content to note that this can be
done. We shall term such forecasts H-based .
There are two similar but slightly different scenarios that we can analyse, with essen-
tially identical results. In the first, which we may term the independence scenario, the
background information Hk pertains solely to individual Ik, and it is supposed that, given
Hk, Your uncertainty about Ek, as expressed by pk, would not change if You were to re-
ceive any further information (be it background information or outcome information) on
any of the other individuals. In the second, sequential scenario, Hk represents the total
background information on all previous and current individuals I1, . . . , Ik, as well as the
outcomes of E1, . . . , Ek−1 for the previous individuals; no other conditions need be imposed.
An important practical application, in the sequential formulation, is to weather fore-
casting, where Ik denotes day k, Ek denotes “rain on day k,” Hk denotes the (possibly very
detailed) information You have about the weather (including whether or not it rained) up
to and including the previous day k − 1, and You have to go on TV at 6pm each evening
and announce Your probability pk that it will rain the following day Ik. We will often use
this particular example to clarify general concepts.
Our proposed relationship between individual probabilities and group frequencies will
be based on the following idea: Although You are free to announce any probability values
You want for rain tomorrow, if You are to be trusted as a reliable weather forecaster, these
values should bear some relationship to whether or not it does actually rain on the days
for which You have issued forecasts. Note that this approach judges Your probabilities
by comparison with the outcomes of the events—not with the “true probabilities” of the
events. No commitment as to the existence of “true probabilities” is called for.
8.1 Calibration
Let ek denote the actual outcome of event Ek, coded 1 if Ek happens, and 0 if it does not.
8.1.1 Overall calibration
We start by proposing the following overall calibration criterion of agreement between the
probability forecasts (pk) and the outcomes (ek): over a long initial sequence I1, I2, . . . , IN ,
the overall proportion of the associated events that occur,
∑
N
i=1
ei
N
, (1)
which is a “groupist” property, should be close to the average of the “individualist” forecast
probabilities,
∑
N
i=1
pi
N
. (2)
This seems a plausible requirement, but do we have a good warrant for imposing it?
Yes. It can be shown (Dawid 1982b) that (for either of the scenarios) the overall calibration
property is assigned probability 1 by Your underlying probability distribution. That is to
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say, You firmly believe that Your probability forecasts will display overall calibration.
So, if overall calibration turns out not to be satisfied, an event that You were convinced
was going to happen has failed to occur—a serious anomaly, that discredits Your whole
distribution, and with it Your probability forecasts (Dawid 2004). Overall calibration thus
acts as a minimal “sanity check” on your probabiity forecasts: if it fails, You are clearly
doing something wrong.
However, that does not mean that, if it holds, You are doing everything right: overall
calibration is a weak requirement. For example, in an environment where it rains 50% of
the time, a weather forecaster who, ignoring all information about the past weather, always
announces a probability of 50%, will satisfy overall calibration—but if in fact it rains every
alternate day (and much more generally) he will be showing little genuine ability to forecast
the changing weather on a day-by-day basis. Another forecaster, who has a crystal ball,
always gives probability 1 or 0 to rain, and always gets it right. Her perfect forecasts also
satisfy overall calibration.
In order to make finer distinctions between forecasts of such very different quality, we
will progressively strengthen the calibration criterion, through a number of stages. Note,
importantly, that every such strengthened variant will share the “sanity check” function
described above for overall calibration: according to Your probability distribution, it will
be satisfied with probability 1. So, if it fails, Your probability forecasts are discredited.
8.1.2 Probability calibration
For our next step, instead of taking the averages in (1) and (2) over all days until day N ,
we focus on just those days Ik for which the forecast probability pk was equal to (or very
close to) some pre-assigned value. If that value is, say, 30% (and that value is eventually
used infinitely often) then probability calibration requires that, in the limit, the proportion
of these days on which it in fact rains should be (close to) 30%; and similarly for any other
pre-assigned value.
However, although probability calibration is again a very natural idea, it is still too
weak for our purpose. In particular, it will still be satisfied for both our above examples
of uninformative forecasts and of perfect forecasts.
8.1.3 Subset calibration
For our next attempt, we allow the averages in (1) and (2) to be restricted to a subset of the
individuals, arbitrarily chosen except for the requirement that it must be selected without
taking any account of the values of the E and the H ’s. For example, we might choose every
second day. If in fact the weather alternates wet, dry, wet, dry,. . . , then the uninformative
forecaster, who always says 50%, will now fail on this criterion, since if we restrict to the
odd days alone his average forecast probability is still 50%, but the proportion of rainy
days will now be 100%. The perfect forecaster will however be announcing a probability
forecast of 100% for every odd day, and so will satisfy this criterion.
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However, although subset calibration has succeeded in making the desired distinction,
even this is not strong enough for our purposes.
8.1.4 Information-based calibration
In all our attempts so far, we have not made any essential use of the background information
base H, and the requirement that the forecasts be H-based. But we cannot properly check
whether a forecaster is making appropriate use of this background information without
ourselves taking account of it.
In the sequential weather forecasting scenario, the forecaster is supposed to be taking
account of (at least) whether or not it rained on previous days, and to be responding
appropriately to any pattern that may be present in those outcomes. To test this, we
could form a test subset in a dynamic way, ourselves taking account of all the forecaster’s
background information (but, to be totally fair to the forecaster, nothing else6). Thus we
might consider, for example, the subset comprising just those Tuesdays when it had rained
on both previous days. If the forecaster is doing a proper job, he should be calibrated (i.e.,
his average probability forecast should agree with the actual proportion of rainy days), even
if we restrict the averages to be over such an “H-based” subset. An essentially identical
definition applies in the independence scenario.
When this property is satisfied for all H-based subsets, we will call the probability
forecasts H calibrated . A set of forecasts that is both H-based and H-calibrated will be
called H-valid . Again we stress that You assign probability 1 to Your H-based forecasts
being H-valid, so this is an appropriate condition to impose on them.
Finally, we have a strong criterion relating individual probability forecasts and fre-
quencies. Indeed, it constrains the individuals forecasts so much that, in the limit at least,
their values are fully determined. Thus suppose that we have two forecasters, who issue
respective forecasts (pk) and (qk), and that both sets are H-valid. It can then be shown
(Dawid 1982b) that, as k increases without limit, the difference between pk and qk must
approach 0. We may term this result asymptotic identification.
This is a remarkable result. We have supposed that “individual risks” are given, but
have constrained these only through the “groupist” H-calibration criterion. But we see
that this results “almost” in full identification of the individual values, in the sense that,
if two different sets of probability forecasts both satisfy this criterion, then they must be
essentially identical. In particular, if there exists any set of H-valid forecasts,7 then those
values are the “essentially correct” ones: any other set of H-based forecasts that does not
agree, asymptotically, with those values can not be H-valid—and is thus discredited. So
in this sense the i2G approach has succeeded—where the more traditional G2i approaches
failed—in determining the values of individual risks on the basis of group frequencies.
As an almost too simple example of this result, in the independence scenario, suppose
that Hk, the background information for individual Ik, is his score on the Violence Risk
Appraisal Guide ARAI (Quinsey et al. 2006), with 9 categories. If this limited information
6Again, this requirement can be formalised using computability theory.
7which is however not guaranteed (Schervish 1985; Belot 2013)
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H is all that is available to the forecaster, his forecasts will be H-based just when they
announce the identical probability value for all individuals in the same VRAG category.
And they will be H-calibrated if and only if, within each of the 9 categories, his announced
probability agrees with the actual reoffending rates. That is, H-validity here reduces to
the identification of individual risk with individualized risk; and this identification is thus
justified so long as Your complete information is indeed restricted to that comprised by H.
What this simple example fails to exhibit is that, in more general cases, the “deter-
mination” of the individual forecasts is only asymptotic: given a set of H-valid forecasts,
we could typically change their values for a finite number of individuals, without affecting
H-validity. So we are not, after all, able to associate a definitive risk value with any single
individual.
Another big downside of the above result is that, while assuring us of the essential
uniqueness of H-valid forecasts, it is entirely non-constructive. It seems reasonable to
suppose that, once we know that such uniquely determined forecasts exist, there should be
a way to construct them: for example, it would be nice to have an algorithm that would
issue probability forecasts for the following day, based on past weather (H), that will be
properly calibrated, however the future weather in fact turns out. But alas! in general this
is not possible, and there is no H-based system that can be guaranteed to be H-calibrated
(Oakes 1985; Dawid 1985b).
Another potentially serious limitation of the i2G approach is its dependence on the pop-
ulation of individuals considered, and moreover on the order in which they are strung out as
a single sequence. It does not seem easy to accommodate a structure, such as considered in
§6.2, where many students take many resits of many examinations. For one thing, it seems
problematic to incorporate the judgements of exchangeability made there into the i2G
approach; for another, different ways of forming a sequence of student-examination-resit
combinations could well lead to mutually inconsistent calibration requirements.
8.2 Varying the information base
A fundamental aspect of the i2G approach to individual risk is that this is a relative, not
an absolute, concept: its definition and interpretation depend explicitly on the information
that is being taken into account,8 as embodied in H. If we change the information base,
the associated valid probability values will change.
We can relate the i2G risks based on different information bases, one more complete
than the other. Thus suppose that K = (Kk) is an information base that is more detailed
than H: perhaps Hk only gives information about whether or not it rained on days prior to
day k, while Kk also contains information about past maximum temperature, wind speed,
etc. Suppose (pk) is a set of H-valid forecasts, and (qk) a set of K-valid forecasts. These
would typically differ, even asymptotically: We would expect the (qk), being based on more
information, to be “better” than the (pk), and so would not expect pk − qk → 0. This
does not contradict asymptotic identification. The (qk) are not H-based, so not H-valid.
8In this it has some of the flavour of Logical Probability
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Also, while the (pk) are K-based, they have not been required to be K-calibrated, so they
are not K-valid. So, whether we take the underlying information base to be H or K, the
conditions implying asymptotic identification simply do not apply.
It does however follow from the argument for asymptotic identification that, if we
consider the subsequence for which, say, pk = 0.4 (to a good enough approximation),
then—while we can expect the (qk) in that subsequence to vary (because of variations
in the additional information in K that they take into account)—their limiting average
value in the subsequence will be 0.4 (and similarly for any other target value for the
(pk)). In this sense the “deeper” risks (qk) can be regarded as varying “randomly” about
the “shallower” risks (pk)—just as the actual outcomes (Ek) do. Some of the attempts
to model individual risks as random, such that of Robins and Greenland (1989), might
be understood as contemplating an expanded but unobservable information base K, and
interpreting the “true risks” as the K-valid ones. However, with access only to the shallower
information base H, we can only “observe” certain crude averages of these “true risks.” If
H is indeed all the information at our disposal, there is nothing of value to be gained by
extending consideration to the unobservable deeper risks (qk)—which in any case depend
on the essentially arbitrary specification of the unobserved deeper information base K.
The flip-side of this is that, when we do have access to the deeper information, we should
use that to identify the relevant “individual risk,” rather than be satisfied with a cruder
average value based on more superficial information.
An interesting implication of the above argument is that our “individual-to-group” ap-
proach allows for the assignment of non-extreme probabilities to events, even when we
believe in “deep determinism”—that is, we believe that, given a suitably detailed informa-
tion base K, it would be possible to forecast the future perfectly (in which case K-valid
probabilities (qk) would have to be, asymptotically, 0 or 1). However, if we only have access
to a less detailed information base H, the associated H-valid risk values would normally
be non-extreme. This approach thus justifies the use of probability as a description of a
system we believe to operate deterministically, so long as we are in ignorance of the deep
determining circumstances.
9 Discussion
I have surveyed a number of conceptions of the meaning of “individual risk,” and found all
of them wanting to some degree. The various G2i approaches all founder on the “problem
of the reference class,” which does not have an unambiguous solution—although reasonable
pragmatic choices can often be made, and defended as such. The i2G approach avoids am-
biguity and delivers individual risk values, nicely calibrated to the information considered
available—but only “at infinity,” and even then these asymptotic values are uncomputable.
It also does not seem able to take account of sophisticated exchangeability requirements.
What then is one to do? Should the whole idea of individual risk be abandoned?
I think this is too extreme, but certainly the concept and nomenclature should not be
bandied about carelessly, and it behoves any one using the term to give an account of what
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they (think they) mean by it.
For what it is worth, my own tentative attitude is as follows, based on an essentially
personalistic viewpoint. Suppose I am tasked with assessing “the risk” that Cain, a prisoner
up for possible parole, will if released commit a violent act (say, within the next 24 months).
Then I should think about Cain, and, taking full account of all I know about him and others
like him (and even unlike him), compute my probability forecast by assessing the odds at
which I would be willing to bet that he will commit a violent act. This probability can in
principle be considered as formed, by conditioning on the information I have on Cain and
others, from my full personal joint probability distribution for the properties and outcomes
of all these individuals. Under certain strong conditions on that joint distribution, such as
exchangeability, my forecast probability would be close to the proportion of such events in
people “like Cain”; but more generally, that proportion, and other relevant proportions,
would inform, but not directly constrain, my personal, properly conditioned, individual
probability forecast for Cain.
But, you object, what of objectivity? You want to know “the risk” that Cain will be
violent. Why should you care about my personal probability assessment?
Well, in the large my probability forecasts can be tested against realised outcomes
(Dawid 1986), e.g., using finite-data analogues of calibration (Seillier-Moiseiwitsch and Dawid 1993)
to see how closely they align with actual frequencies in appropriately selected sets.9 If,
by such tests (formal or informal), my announced probability forecasts are shown to be
out of line with reality, you have every right to discount my risk assessment for Cain.
But if they have passed a suitable battery of such tests—are, provisionally, “valid”—then
(arguing informally by analogy with our asymptotic identification result) we might expect
them to be close to the valid risk assessments of others. So, in the presence of a sufficient
quantity of relevant data to allow us to conduct such statistical tests, you should be able to
judge whether my risk assessments are reasonably “objective,” and if so have some limited
confidence in my—now statistically justified—announced risk for Cain.
But recall that “valid” probability forecasts depend on the information that is being
taken into account. Ideally this should be the most detailed information we have about
Cain and those like him; but, the more detailed the information is, the harder it will
be for me to make my forecasts valid.10 So I might choose to artifically restrict my in-
formation base, perhaps to just a few simple characteristics. I would thus be sacrificing
incisiveness—the possibility (however remote) of making “deep” probability forecasts, valid
with respect to the deep information that I could, in principle, take into account—in favour
of robustness—the enhanced prospect of achieving validity with respect to deliberately re-
stricted information. In the judicial context, and many others, this sacrifice might well
9One criterion I should definitely not be judged on is how good my probability forecasts are as estimates
of the “objective” individual risks. This is for two reasons: first, in the unavoidable absence of knowledge
of the values of those risks, this can not be done; and, secondly, there are no such things!
10Individual risk assessment based on very detailed personal information becomes essentially a matter of
“clinical judgment.” Although practitioners in many disciplines—medicine, law, psychiatry, etc. etc.—
often have great confidence in their own clinical judgments, these can be very far from being valid
(Meehl 1954).
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be considered worthwhile: indeed, a suitable specification of what would be “appropriate”
characteristics to take into account could be enshrined in statute.11 That done, suitable
statistical methodology applied to these could produce valid risk assessments—albeit relat-
ing to a shallower level of information than would ideally be desirable. The various ARAI
systems that have been developed can be thought of as addressing this task.
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